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Problem solving / Cristina Bicchieri / Solution concept / Extensive-form game / Rationality / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Centipede game / Rational choice theory / Belief revision / Game theory / Science / Knowledge


MARTIN DUFWENBERG and JOHAN LINDI~N INCONSISTENCIES IN EXTENSIVE GAMES Common Knowledge Is Not the Issue
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Document Date: 2007-04-24 20:26:19

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City

Princeton / Uppsala / Chicago / Riezlern / /

Country

Austria / Netherlands / /

Facility

Store Paradox / /

IndustryTerm

belief revision technology / belief systems / backward induction solution / classical solution / minimal beliefs algorithm / classical solutions / /

Organization

Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences / /

Person

Werner Gfith / JOHAN LINDI / MARTIN DUFWENBERG / Cristina Bicchieri / Harold Kuhn / Kaushik Basu / /

Position

choosing forward / Ifil player / Each player / Rl Player / Be-R1 player / node player / player / /

Technology

following algorithm / minimal beliefs algorithm / belief revision technology / /

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