An Agency Theory Model of ERP Implementation Vedabrata Basu

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Date: 2011-04-01 16:50:11 Information Economics Law and economics Agency law Business law Principal–agent problem Theory of the firm Moral hazard Law of agency Asymmetric information Market failure Business		An Agency Theory Model of ERP Implementation Vedabrata Basu Add to Reading List Source URL: www.geocities.ws Download Document from Source Website File Size: 205,61 KB Share Document on Facebook

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