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![]() Date: 2015-05-21 10:29:12Economic theories Game theory Hold-up problem Industrial organization Market failure Economics Market Incomplete contracts Microeconomics Contract theory Petra Aversion | Add to Reading List |
![]() | CREE Working PaperVoluntary contributions to bargaining: hold-up problem in the labDocID: 1sjwx - View Document |
![]() | Ownership, Control, and Incentive Tianxi Wang Abstract The paper shows that the principal can enhance her control over the agent’s human capital by acquiring the physical capital that is critical for him to create valuDocID: 1pQBq - View Document |
![]() | Microsoft Word - RevMauaTables140214RMDocID: 1pQzS - View Document |
![]() | WORKING PAPER N° On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationshipDocID: 1pCMt - View Document |
![]() | Microsoft Word - SFB_Newsletter_April_2013DocID: 1p4np - View Document |