6 Barriers to Manipulation in Voting Vincent Conitzera and Toby Walshb 6.1 Introduction In many situations, voters may vote strategically. That is, they may declare preferences that are not their true ones, with the aim

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Date: 2014-12-28 15:05:15 Single winner electoral systems Political philosophy Voting system criteria Voting systems Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem Tactical voting Condorcet criterion Instant-runoff voting Borda count Voting Social choice theory Voting theory		6 Barriers to Manipulation in Voting Vincent Conitzera and Toby Walshb 6.1 Introduction In many situations, voters may vote strategically. That is, they may declare preferences that are not their true ones, with the aim Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cs.duke.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 356,69 KB Share Document on Facebook

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