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Decision theory / Fixed points / Algebraic graph theory / Price of anarchy / Nash equilibrium / Connectivity / Graph / Strongly regular graph / Regular graph / Graph theory / Mathematics / Game theory


The Price of Selfish Behavior in Bilateral Network Formation Jacomo Corbo, David Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences 33 Oxford Street, Maxwell Dworkin, Harvard University {jacomo, parkes}@eecs.harvard.edu
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Document Date: 2005-06-02 14:46:50

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File Size: 350,78 KB

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Las Vegas / /

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Cambridge University Press / Constructed Overlay Routing Networks / The star / Nash Networks / Harvard University Press / STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF NETWORKS / /

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United States / /

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Harvard University / /

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efficient solution / efficient networks / stable networks / stable network / worst case network / worst-case equilibrium networks / equilibrium networks / interaction protocol / equilibrium network / empty network / costly stable networks / social welfare-maximizing solution / efficient network / communication networks / precise algorithm / proper equilibrium network / /

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Cambridge University / Harvard University / Artificial Intelligence / David Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences / Division of Link Costs / UCG BCG / /

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Nash Equilibrium / Gabrielle Demange / O. Tercieux / V / David Parkes / /

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system designer / Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation / General / cost-sharing model of network formation / player / bilateral consent-driven model of network formation / /

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Nevada / /

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Lecture Notes in Computer Science / Journal of Economic Theory / /

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alpha / load balancing / interaction protocol / Peer-to-Peer / File Sharing / Quality of Service / /

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