Supplementary Appendices to: "Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation" George-Levi Gayle Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of St - St. George - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Supplementary Appendices to: "Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation" George-Levi Gayle Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of St Add to Reading List Document Date: 2016-04-25 17:57:00 Open Document File Size: 213,93 KB Share Result on Facebook

Supplementary Appendices to: "Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation" George-Levi Gayle Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of StAdd to Reading List