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MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model
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Document Date: 2005-03-12 04:19:21
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MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model