MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model - Signaling game - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model Add to Reading List Document Date: 2005-03-12 04:19:21 Open Document File Size: 97,12 KB Share Result on Facebook IndustryTerm e-choices / / Position L-worker / worker / player / low worker / high worker / H-worker / / SocialTag Economics Signaling game Strategy Economic equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Science Bayesian game Nash equilibrium Game theory Problem solving

MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this modelAdd to Reading List