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Decision theory / Reinhard Selten / John Harsanyi / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Nash equilibrium / Bargaining problem / Bayesian game / Roger Myerson / Sequential equilibrium / Game theory / Economics / Problem solving
Date: 2010-10-06 05:34:08
Decision theory
Reinhard Selten
John Harsanyi
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Nash equilibrium
Bargaining problem
Bayesian game
Roger Myerson
Sequential equilibrium
Game theory
Economics
Problem solving

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