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![]() Date: 2010-12-07 13:11:58Nash equilibrium Solution concept Sequential equilibrium Proper equilibrium Strategy Best response Extensive-form game Information set Strategic dominance Game theory Problem solving Trembling hand perfect equilibrium | Source URL: www.dklevine.comDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 669,09 KBShare Document on Facebook |
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![]() | Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria∗ Roger Myerson† and Jörgen Weibull‡ September 3, 2012. This version: November 28, 2014. Abstract. When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usuallDocID: 14V7l - View Document |
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![]() | Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria∗ Roger Myerson† and Jörgen Weibull‡ September 3, 2012. This version: November 28, 2014. Abstract. When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usuallDocID: 10nU1 - View Document |