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Nash equilibrium / Solution concept / Sequential equilibrium / Proper equilibrium / Strategy / Best response / Extensive-form game / Information set / Strategic dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Date: 2010-12-07 13:11:58
Nash equilibrium
Solution concept
Sequential equilibrium
Proper equilibrium
Strategy
Best response
Extensive-form game
Information set
Strategic dominance
Game theory
Problem solving
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium

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