Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance

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Date: 2012-02-07 10:18:23 Organizational theory Principal–agent problem Management Medicine Income Incentive Labour economics Motivation Pay for performance Behavior Asymmetric information Market failure		Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance Add to Reading List Source URL: ftp.iza.org Download Document from Source Website File Size: 353,38 KB Share Document on Facebook

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