Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT

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Date: 2013-10-17 13:33:42 Merit pay No Child Left Behind Act Teacher Incentive District of Columbia Public Schools Andhra Pradesh Randomized Evaluation Studies Principal–agent problem Education Teaching Employment compensation		Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT Add to Reading List Source URL: educators4excellence.s3.amazonaws.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 2,72 MB Share Document on Facebook

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