Texas A&M University / University of Maryland / University of Massachusetts-Amherst / Harvard University / /
IndustryTerm
radical solution / Different solutions / /
Organization
Harvard’s Kennedy School / University of Massachusetts / Harvard University / Department of Economics / University of Maryland / Instituto Milenio SCI / Helsinki School of Economics / Texas A&M University / MIT’s Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research / Environmental Protection Agency / /
Person
John Duggan / Tom Tietenberg / Jerry R. Green / Joanne Roberts / Martin L. Weitzman / Lawrence M. Ausubel / Peter Cramton / Paul L. Joskow / Robert Wilson / Ilan Kremer / Juan Dubra / Marc J. Roberts / Marcelo Caffera / Marty Weitzman / Vincent Crawford / William Vickrey / Daniel F. Spulber / Larry Goulder / Paul Milgrom / Hal R. Varian / Tony Creane / Peter Hammond / Kjell G. Nyborg / Paul Klemperer / Partha Dasgupta / Suzi Kerr / Robert N. Stavins / Jean-Jacques Laffont / David McAdams / Eric Maskin / Steven N. Wiggins / Bill Hogan / Gary D. Libecap / Alberto Hurtado / Hans Gersbach / Evan Kwerel / Michael Spence / /
Position
known player / mechanism designer / Editor / player / auctioneer / /
A Simple Auction Mechanism for the Optimal Allocation of the Commons Juan-Pablo Montero∗ July 1, 2007 Abstract