<--- Back to Details
First PageDocument Content
Fair division / Networks / Strategyproof / Single winner electoral systems / Independence of irrelevant alternatives / Preference / Mechanism design / Affect / Approval voting / Social choice theory / Game theory / Economics
Date: 2015-01-16 09:43:40
Fair division
Networks
Strategyproof
Single winner electoral systems
Independence of irrelevant alternatives
Preference
Mechanism design
Affect
Approval voting
Social choice theory
Game theory
Economics

Microsoft Word - EDP-1213

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk

Download Document from Source Website

File Size: 270,26 KB

Share Document on Facebook

Similar Documents

Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving Felix Brandt Christian Geist

DocID: 1sVUW - View Document

Game theory / Mechanism design / Decision theory / Gaming / Strategyproofness / Mathematics / Fourier analysis / Generalized functions / Rental harmony

Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games? Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, Athens, G

DocID: 1reb6 - View Document

Game theory / Mechanism design / Decision theory / Gaming / Information / Vickrey auction / Strategyproofness / Incentive compatibility / Grid computing / Distributed computing / Social peer-to-peer processes / Algorithmic mechanism design

Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138

DocID: 1qSH9 - View Document

Game theory / Mechanism design / Strategyproofness / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Distributed algorithmic mechanism design / Double auction / Incentive compatibility / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Algorithmic mechanism design / Network formation / Mathematical optimization

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard∗ David C. Parkes† Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAMay 21, 2003

DocID: 1pGGu - View Document

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research602 Submitted 08/15; publishedFinding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving

DocID: 1nhqJ - View Document