Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters Alberto Bisin (NYU), Alessandro Lizzeri (NYU), and Leeat Yariv (Caltech) May 14, 2013 Abstract Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for government - Overlapping generations model - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters Alberto Bisin (NYU), Alessandro Lizzeri (NYU), and Leeat Yariv (Caltech) May 14, 2013 Abstract Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for government Add to Reading List Document Date: 2015-02-12 11:27:03 Open Document File Size: 289,31 KB Share Result on Facebook

Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters Alberto Bisin (NYU), Alessandro Lizzeri (NYU), and Leeat Yariv (Caltech) May 14, 2013 Abstract Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for government Add to Reading List