Unbeatable Imitation∗ Peter Duersch† J¨org Oechssler ‡

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Date: 2012-04-17 03:45:32 Gaming Nash equilibrium Matching pennies Chicken Normal-form game Best response Zero–sum game Symmetric game Minimax Game theory Problem solving Decision theory		Unbeatable Imitation∗ Peter Duersch† J¨org Oechssler ‡ Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ.ucdavis.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 268,03 KB Share Document on Facebook

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