Electoral Equilibria under Scoring Voting Rules: Beyond Plurality Dodge Cahan and Arkadii Slinko Department of Mathematics The University of Auckland - Median voter theorem - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Electoral Equilibria under Scoring Voting Rules: Beyond Plurality Dodge Cahan and Arkadii Slinko Department of Mathematics The University of Auckland Add to Reading List Document Date: 2012-04-02 23:59:15 Open Document File Size: 522,30 KB Share Result on Facebook Company Eaton / / Facility Mathematics The University of Auckland February / / Organization Plurality Dodge Cahan and Arkadii Slinko Department / University of Auckland / / SocialTag Game theory Social choice theory Politics Voting theory Psephology Approval voting Voting system Median voter theorem Nash equilibrium Voting

Electoral Equilibria under Scoring Voting Rules: Beyond Plurality Dodge Cahan and Arkadii Slinko Department of Mathematics The University of AucklandAdd to Reading List