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Market structure / Marketing / Pricing / Market economics) / Game theory / Economy / Cartels / Tacit collusion / Oligopoly / Economic equilibrium / Mathematical optimization / Collusion
Date: 2015-11-01 21:32:47
Market structure
Marketing
Pricing
Market economics)
Game theory
Economy
Cartels
Tacit collusion
Oligopoly
Economic equilibrium
Mathematical optimization
Collusion

"Pricing algorithm and collusion (Job Market Paper)"

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