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Cognitive science / Materialism / Physicalism / Cognition / A priori and a posteriori / Naming and Necessity / Saul Kripke / Type physicalism / Functionalism / Philosophy / Mind / Dichotomies
Date: 2006-08-24 10:32:43
Cognitive science
Materialism
Physicalism
Cognition
A priori and a posteriori
Naming and Necessity
Saul Kripke
Type physicalism
Functionalism
Philosophy
Mind
Dichotomies

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