Princeton University / University of Iowa / Penn State University / Evans Hall / Stanford University / University of Illinois / Memorial Way / Columbia University / University of Chicago / New York University / Arizona State University / University of Texas / University of California / /
IndustryTerm
production technologies / homogenous products / chemicals / /
Organization
Rutgers / Columbia University / New York University / Department of Economics / UC Berkeley / University of California / Berkeley / Princeton University / Federal Bureau of Investigation / Penn State University / School of Business / University of Illinois / Arizona State University / University of Chicago / Stanford University / University of Iowa / Joint Executive Committee / Stanford / University of Texas / /
Person
Robert H. Porter / Ichiro Obara / Valerie Y. Suslow / Kyna Fong / Paul Heidhues / David Pearce / Dilip Abreu / David K. Levine / Paul Milgrom / Margaret C. Levenstein / Skrzypacz / George A. Hay / Roy Radner / Chris Sanchirico / Wallace P. Mullin / R. Preston McAfee / John McMillan / Washington Univer / Daniel Kelley / Drew Fudenberg / Robert Wilson / Andreas Blume / Susan Athey / Kurt Eichenwald / George J. Stigler / JO QFSJPE / Joseph E. Harrington / Thomas Ulen / Luis M. B. Cabral / Eric Maskin / Joseph Harrington / Roger Myerson / Jeremy Bulow / Kyle Bagwell / Hugo Hopenhayn / Masaki Aoyagi / Edward J. Green / Stanford Grad / /
Position
Rt / player / candidate for equilibrium / realistic nonstationary model / with bounded instantaneous prices / Porter / /
Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production By Yuliy Sannikov and Andrzej Skrzypacz* We show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when (a) goods are homogenous and fi