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Markov processes / Game theory / Strategy / Stochastic game / Markov decision process / Probability and statistics / Probability / Computability theory
Date: 2017-10-06 04:04:07
Markov processes
Game theory
Strategy
Stochastic game
Markov decision process
Probability and statistics
Probability
Computability theory

Software Tools for Technology Transfer manuscript No. (will be inserted by the editor) PRISM-games: Verification and Strategy Synthesis for Stochastic Multi-player Games with Multiple Objectives Marta Kwiatkowska1 , Davi

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Source URL: qav.comlab.ox.ac.uk

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