Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values? John Broome University of Oxford From: Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, edited by Christopher Morris and Arthur

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Date: 2002-08-01 11:45:55 Reasoning Philosophy Logic Cognition Reason Practical reason Argument Normative Deductive reasoning Ethics Rationality Defeasible reasoning		Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values? John Broome University of Oxford From: Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, edited by Christopher Morris and Arthur Add to Reading List Source URL: users.ox.ac.uk Download Document from Source Website File Size: 60,88 KB Share Document on Facebook

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