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Operations research / Approximation algorithm / Randomized rounding / Greedy algorithm / Algorithm / Relaxation / Combinatorial auction / Price of anarchy / Linear programming / Travelling salesman problem / Integer programming / Semidefinite programming
Date: 2015-12-11 02:28:02
Operations research
Approximation algorithm
Randomized rounding
Greedy algorithm
Algorithm
Relaxation
Combinatorial auction
Price of anarchy
Linear programming
Travelling salesman problem
Integer programming
Semidefinite programming

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round ¨ PAUL DUTTING, ETH Z¨ urich

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