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Game theory / Bimatrix game / LemkeHowson algorithm / Best response / Zero-sum game / Matching pennies / Strategy / Normal-form game / Risk dominance / Symmetric game
Date: 2012-06-24 02:05:21
Game theory
Bimatrix game
LemkeHowson algorithm
Best response
Zero-sum game
Matching pennies
Strategy
Normal-form game
Risk dominance
Symmetric game

Computation of completely mixed equilibrium payoffs in bimatrix games

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Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

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