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![]() Date: 2010-12-07 13:11:58Nash equilibrium Solution concept Sequential equilibrium Proper equilibrium Strategy Best response Extensive-form game Information set Strategic dominance Game theory Problem solving Trembling hand perfect equilibrium | Source URL: www.dklevine.comDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 669,09 KBShare Document on Facebook |
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