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Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers∗ Guillaume Fréchette New York University, Dept of Economics John H. Kagel
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Document Date: 2011-12-15 19:09:29

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City

Rapoport / Pittsburgh / /

Event

Person Communication and Meetings / /

Facility

Economics John H. Kagel The Ohio State University / Ohio State University / Economics Massimo Morelli The Ohio State University / Alternating Offers∗ Guillaume Fréchette New York University / Mershon Center / Wallis Institute of Political Economy / /

IndustryTerm

demand bargaining protocol / parliamentary systems / randomization protocols / offer protocol / /

Organization

Mershon Center / Institute for Advanced Study / HBS / Department of Political Science / Econometric Society / New York University / Wallis Institute of Political Economy / National Science Foundation / Harvard / The Ohio State University / Stanford / /

Person

Guillaume Fréchette / Maria Montero / Thomas Palfrey / James Peck / John H. Kagel / /

Position

Apex player and a base player / investigator / party leader / small player / base player / player / Apex player / /

Technology

offer protocol / demand bargaining protocol / randomization protocols / /

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