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Mind / John Searle / Direction of fit / Intentionality / Illocutionary act / Proposition / Speech act / Reason / Belief / Philosophy of language / Linguistics / Philosophy
Date: 2007-01-14 21:28:13
Mind
John Searle
Direction of fit
Intentionality
Illocutionary act
Proposition
Speech act
Reason
Belief
Philosophy of language
Linguistics
Philosophy

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