The Timing of Sovereign Defaults Over Electoral Terms

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2012-05-23 13:58:02 Debt Financial crises Public economics Fiscal policy Default Sovereign default Municipal bond Default trap Economics Government debt Financial economics		The Timing of Sovereign Defaults Over Electoral Terms Add to Reading List Source URL: www.federalreserve.gov Download Document from Source Website File Size: 242,77 KB Share Document on Facebook

	The Employment Cost of Sovereign Default? Neele L. Balke† May 12, 2017 First version: October 2016 Click for latest version DocID: 1v1t6 - View Document
	Discussion of “Sovereign Default and Monetary Policy Tradeoﬀs”∗ Ricardo Reis London School of Economics 1. DocID: 1uAZT - View Document
	Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions Nicola Gennaioli, Alberto Martin and Stefano Rossi∗ This version: NovemberAbstract DocID: 1srWi - View Document
	Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Default, and Bailouts1 Falko Juessen Bergische Universitaet Wuppertal Andreas Schabert2 University of Cologne DocID: 1sdrE - View Document
	FrankfurtVortrag Kämmerer PPP DocID: 1rmwm - View Document