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Politics / Public choice theory / Voting system criteria / Single winner electoral systems / Condorcet criterion / Voting system / Median voter theorem / Marquis de Condorcet / Majority / Voting / Voting theory / Social choice theory
Date: 2011-04-05 10:35:00
Politics
Public choice theory
Voting system criteria
Single winner electoral systems
Condorcet criterion
Voting system
Median voter theorem
Marquis de Condorcet
Majority
Voting
Voting theory
Social choice theory

Condorcet Consistency and the Median Voter

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Source URL: econpapers.wiwi.kit.edu

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