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Fair division / Networks / Strategyproof / Single winner electoral systems / Independence of irrelevant alternatives / Preference / Mechanism design / Affect / Approval voting / Social choice theory / Game theory / Economics
Date: 2015-01-16 09:43:40
Fair division
Networks
Strategyproof
Single winner electoral systems
Independence of irrelevant alternatives
Preference
Mechanism design
Affect
Approval voting
Social choice theory
Game theory
Economics

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